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西湖区益乐新村十几位村民为300位工人腾出20多间浴室_我的网站

继承者们

一 | 工人去沈凡盛家（右）洗澡记者江玥摄沈凡盛和妈妈从工地直接赶来，一身的汗，落脚就能洗上热水澡。

二 |

Wind turbines operate at a wind farm in Burqin County, Altay Prefecture, Northwest China's Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, on July 25, 2026. Photo: VCG
In economics, overcapacity is a dynamic and relative concept. Supply-demand balance is temporary, and imbalance is the norm. The Western narrative that equates the sheer scale of China's production capacity directly with "overcapacity" is, frankly, economically illiterate. It conflates size with pathology.
Consider the math. China's manufacturing sector accounts for roughly 30 percent of global manufacturing value-added - a dominance unmatched since the post-war US. Yet this reflects not overcapacity but competitive capacity. The critics ignore that China's trade surplus in 2025 reached a record $1.2 trillion, roughly equivalent to the GDP of a top-20 economy like Saudi Arabia. They ignore that Chinese exports carry high import content - foreign value-added accounts for nearly half of gross export value - meaning China's capacity integrates global supply chains rather than displacing them.
The judgment lacks rigor because it applies a static snapshot to a dynamic system. It assumes that if China produces more than it currently consumes domestically, the surplus is automatically "overcapacity." Nonsense. By that logic, Germany's persistent trade surplus in automobiles and machinery would constitute chronic overcapacity. It does not, because German capacity serves global demand. So does China's. The narrative isn't economics. It's politics dressed in economic jargon.
Western critics attribute the price advantages of Chinese green technology products to "government subsidies" and "market distortion." This is a convenient story. It is also wrong. The global competitiveness of China's green technology industries stems from four interconnected factors: massive domestic market scale, decades of sustained infrastructure investment, a highly educated STEM workforce, and fierce intra-industry competition. China's NEV purchase-tax exemptions, extended through 2027, total approximately 520 billion yuan ($77.05 billion). Substantial? Yes. But causally linked to overcapacity? No.
The causal chain critics imagine - subsidies → artificial competitiveness → overproduction - collapses under scrutiny. The EU's IPCEI battery programs allocated over 6 billion euros, plus EIB financing. The US CHIPS Act appropriated $54.2 billion for semiconductors, while the Inflation Reduction Act funnels hundreds of billions into clean energy. All major economies subsidize strategic industries. The difference is that China converted subsidies into systemic efficiency: its nominal lithium-ion cell capacity reached approximately 2.2 TWh by end-2023, driving global average battery pack prices down 20 percent year-on-year to $115 per kilowatt-hour in 2024. That is not distortion. That's innovation at scale.
Chinese firms filed 20,081 European patent applications in 2024 - 10.1 percent of the total, with battery technology patents surging 79 percent year-on-year. Patents reflect innovation, not subsidy dependency. The causal link between subsidies and overcapacity is weak; the link between scale, innovation, and competitiveness is robust.
Meanwhile, global demand for green and low-carbon transition is experiencing explosive growth. The International Energy Agency projects that renewable capacity additions must triple by 2030 to meet Paris Agreement targets. In this context, labeling China's wind, photovoltaic, and battery capacity as "overcapacity" is not merely wrong - it is dangerously counterproductive.
In fact, China's capacity has played an indispensable role in advancing the global energy transition. Chinese solar module production costs have fallen roughly 90 percent over the past decade. Goldman Sachs Research notes that China manufactured approximately 86 percent of global solar modules, 80 percent of lithium-ion batteries, and 68 percent of electric vehicles in 2024. This is not overcapacity dumped on foreign markets; it is capacity the world desperately needs.
The "overcapacity" label assumes a zero-sum game where Chinese production crowds out others. The reality is synergistic: Chinese capacity lowers global clean energy costs, enabling faster deployment worldwide. The "overcapacity" label holds only if one believes the world should slow decarbonization to protect less competitive producers and to empower those that deliberately employ "burn, baby, burn" tactics. That's industrial protectionism intersecting with brown imperialism, and it's disproportionately impacting the Global South, which is more vulnerable to climate breakdown, precisely when it's finally trying to shake off centuries of systemic Western exploitation and suppression.
Furthermore, the disparity in how the West treats its own industrial policy versus China's is glaring. When the US funnels $52.7 billion through the CHIPS Act for semiconductors, or when the EU subsidizes Airbus, or when American agricultural subsidies distort global food markets, the silence from Western media is deafening. When China gains an edge in manufacturing, it faces media offensives and policy restrictions.
This is not inconsistency. This is strategy. The underlying motivation is the "China threat" rubric - a framework that treats China's development itself as a danger to the Western-led order. Countries wagging their fingers at China do so not because China violates economic rules they themselves follow, but because China succeeds under rules they once wrote to their own advantage.
These accusers possess their own national industrial policies and subsidies. They have long exploited historical and contemporary advantages against China and developing countries. They have not competed well, have not provided themselves with good governance, and have not invested adequately in their own infrastructure, education, and R&D. They have allowed their own leading industries to seek monopolistic positions detrimental not only to others but to their own consumers. Rather than reform themselves, they blame China.
In these contexts, the cry of "China Shock 2.0" is the latest iteration of an old playbook: frame China's development as a threat to global stability rather than a contribution to global progress. The claim that China's advances in renewable energy and AI will send more serious shock waves than traditional manufacturing displacement is analytically flawed and politically motivated.
First, the premise is false. China is not reducing the market share of developed countries through unfair means; it is outcompeting them through innovation, scale, and efficiency. According to Goldman Sachs Research, China's "new three" green technology sectors alone contributed around one percentage point to the country's 5.4 percent nominal export growth in 2025. This is competitive capacity serving global demand, not overcapacity dumped on foreign markets.
Second, the "shock" framing ignores history. China maintained production and trade flows in 2020 while major Western economies crashed, providing essential goods to global markets, likely saving millions of lives while mitigating what would have been greater global economic harm. The "shock" is not to the global economy; it is to Western complacency.
Third, the argument is self-contradictory. The critics want China to be simultaneously weak enough to dismiss and strong enough to fear. If China's high-tech development is genuinely formidable - so innovative and efficient that it threatens to displace developed economies - then it is delivering precisely the technological progress the world needs to meet climate goals. Restricting it through tariffs and barriers would harm global innovation, raise energy costs for developing countries, and slow decarbonization. The critics would be sacrificing the planet to protect their own complacency.
"China Shock 2.0" is a rhetorical device to justify protectionism. It replaces engagement with containment, competition with confrontation. The world does not need another shock doctrine. It needs cooperation, investment, and the recognition that China's rise is not a threat but an opportunity - for green transition, for technological progress, for shared prosperity, and for a shared future.
The author is a professor of politics and international relations and director of the Center for Ecological Civilization at East China Normal University in Shanghai. [email protected]
。在西湖区古荡街道益乐新村的台风安置点，这样的“待遇”，让工人凌贺前直呼“跟在家里一样舒坦”。8月8日下午，益乐新村接到紧急通知：华商工地300多名工人，需在当晚6点前全部转移至新村安置点。

三 | 一场与台风赛跑的安置行动，在两个小时内完成。安置点里，最让工友们意外的，是村民敞开家门、借出浴室给他们洗澡。

四 | 紧急转移8月8日下午4点，益乐新村和华商工地同时收到了紧急转移通知。工地负责人苗连庆马上在工作群里发了消息，叮嘱各班班长转告工友：晚上6点前必须完成吃饭洗漱，统一前往安置点避险。

五 | 为了不耽误转移进度，工地食堂提前备餐，不到4点半，300多名工人已经收拾好了行李。益乐新村这边，村党委副书记沈国良立刻部署，社区工作人员迅速到岗。

六 | “应对‘巴威’台风时积累了经验，这次人数虽多，但各环节都有条不紊。”沈国良说。工地离益乐新村南区的安置点不到一公里，大家排着队，十分钟就到了。临时安置点设在靠近益乐河的社区礼堂里，从接到通知到完成全部清空布置，只用了半个小时。安置点内，防水布从头铺到尾，方便工人们铺开自带的垫被和毯子。空调与电风扇同时运转，矿泉水、方便面、面包和防暑药品整齐码放一旁。工人们头戴安全帽、手拎行李，在引导下分片入驻，不到一小时，300多名工人全部就位。

七 | 村民腾出20多间浴室人都安顿下来了，但沈国良留意到了一个细节：工人们刚从工地上赶来，身上都是汗。益乐新村安置点分为南北两区，北区厕所装了热水器，南区却没有，两地相距1.5公里。应对台风“巴威”时，在南区安置的工友一身汗，只能自己想办法对付。

八 | “大热天，两三天不洗个澡，谁也扛不住。”沈国良当即在村民联络群中发出倡议，号召有条件的村民开放家中闲置浴室，供工友洗漱使用。消息一出，回应像接力赛一样涌来。很快，有十几位村民积极响应，总共腾出20多间浴室。沈凡盛是第一个响应的，他读大二，暑假在家。看到群里的消息，他和妈妈商量后，马上报了名。他把家里一楼、三楼、四楼的浴室全部收拾出来，还备好了毛巾、脸盆和沐浴露。“台风快来了，工友们到村里避险，腾几间浴室，让他们洗个热水澡，这是应该的。”沈凡盛说。除了在群里发动，村里还一对一跟之前了解过的有空房的村民沟通。

九 | “一开始还担心大家有顾虑，没想到大家都蛮积极的。

十 | ”沈国良说。跟在家里一样舒坦当天晚上，工人凌贺前第一个用上了村民家的热水。

十一 | 他从沈凡盛家一楼走出来，头发还在滴水。

十二 | 他甩了甩手上的水珠，笑着说：“从工地直接过来的，一身汗，没想到能在安置点洗上热水澡，浴室收拾得干干净净，跟在自己家里一样舒坦。”工友小组长屠国东排好了本组工友的住宿和洗浴顺序。

十三 | “社区把吃的用的都备得很齐，没想到村民们主动让出自家浴室。”他说，“台风天要在这儿待两三天，洗不上澡确实难熬，现在大家都能冲个热水澡，心里一下子就稳了。”昨天中午，工人邵国强浑身湿淋淋地从外面跑回来，沈国良赶紧领着他往最近的村民家走，正是沈凡盛家。沈凡盛一边递上新拆的香皂，一边招呼：“沐浴露洗发水都有，尽管用。